Friday, October 19, 2012

Structural Response #5


In Egypt, Nassar’s achieved success was very short lived. His regime focused its efforts under the guise of growth and development for the middle class, making sweeping promises and ensuring no opposition threatened his power. However, Nassar’s true intent was to produce an unquestionable and all-powerful rule. His plan made sense, keep the country in a time of peace and relative prosperity and unrest will be manageable. To do this Nassar knew he must appeal to the majority of the population; the middle class.

The Nassar regime was able to silence its opposition and cut off the media outlets used to spread their views but identifying the groups most prone to forming opposition parties and counter-cultures. His main target was the middle class youth, and his form of defense was a solid education focusing on the areas he deemed most important. Nassar poured large amounts of money into the education system, teaching youths about Islamic and Socialist values. The government ended up covering many of the additional fees, and even guaranteed government jobs to all university graduates. His plan worked, universities shifted from places of political dissent and rebellion to campuses full of future government-employed supporters. Eventually, however, money dried up and jobs were lost. The guarantees of the government were not being met and their rhetoric falling apart.  

Opposition groups began to form. The now-educated youth had reasons to oppose the government, whose rhetoric had caught up with them, and groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood gained ground. In the Middle East, Islamist opposition groups experience extreme success in rallying supporters. These groups resonate with deep-seeded cultural and religious norms within many Middle Eastern societies. It is easy to attract large numbers of people all sharing some sort of common understanding. Although not all have identical visions for the country, they can take comfort in the fact that they all share similar moral and cultural backgrounds. These groups are able to provide stability and some forms of democracy while maintaining anti-western ideals.   

Structured Response #4


Nasser silenced opposition through a combination of different types of strategic efforts. In order to ensure that he faced as little opposition as possible, he not only repressed individuals and other independent groups, but he also imposed “the social contract” in an authoritarian-populist manner. According to this weeks readings, Nasser’s Egypt saw little to no outright opposition between 1954 and 1967 – an impressive amount of time to hold such a strong governmental grip on the people. The readings describe Nasser’s government as one that banned all opposition groups and also imposed sate control over groups that had formerly been open to the public. His regime also provided goods to the public in exchange for their political support.
            Most crucially, though, Nasser’s government catered to the youth of his country. He enforced social changes to education by placing it under state control so that he could maintain control over the students through propaganda– the groups of citizens most likely to form opposition groups. His ability to seemingly reason with and understand the younger generation also placed him in a favorable position with the youth. He eased many young people by providing them with free education and guaranteed job placements.
            This ability for the government to placate the student generations of countries seems to be a major reason that Islamist groups have been so popular at the polls. These Islamist groups often promise youth just what they need – something different. Islamist groups tend to depart from the previous government, giving the citizens of its country a fresh look at government. They are able to receive people’s votes because they recognize that people want the opposite of the regimes they have just escaped.  

Thursday, October 18, 2012

Reflection #5

I was reading an interesting article online about the Israeli newspaper industry. Lately, the predominance of the free newspaper, Israel Today, run by American, Sheldon Adelson, is threatening the livelihood of the regions oldest newspapers. Adelson has close ties with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the American Republican party, particularly know for his support of Mitt Romney. Adelson's paper is handed out all over the area, and the new low advertising prices have allowed the paper to dominate 40% the market. This shift is beginning to, and has the potential to, change the political atmosphere of Israel's press. This free newspaper's close ties with the Prime Minister's office are apparent. Israel Today's lead columnist receives not only his salary through the paper, but also an addition salary from the prime minister's office. Even one of Netanyhu's advisers left his job with the minister to aid in the paper's launch. Conveniently, the upcoming election has been pushed up, and Israel Today has Netanyhu far in the lead. If this paper pushes all others out of business, it will be easy for the political office to control the print media in Israel and impossible for citizens to get a unbiased newspaper. 



Reflection #5

During my usual morning stroll to Megabytes to get some coffee and a bagel, I found quite an interesting and in my opinion significant article by David Sanger on the front page of the New York times.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

This particular article outlines how the U.S. claims much of the weaponry that is sent from Qatar to "Syrian rebels" is actually going to the more hardline Islamic groups, not the "more secular opposition groups" within the Syria conflict (Sanger). This, according to the New York times, may be creating future conflict for after either the opposition or the Assad Regime falls (Sanger). There have even been (non conclusive) reports of the radical Syrian Islamist groups buying a capacious amount of weapons from their donor countries and burying them underground for use in future conflict (Sanger).

This may show that there is an increasing radical element within Syrian society which may later serve to further destabilize any rebuilding efforts after the civil war is over. If these radical Islamic organizations obtain more power through Qatar and Saudi Arabia's heavy military aid, civil society may be altered and would undergo vast challenges. Social entrepreneurship initiatives by some of the secular parts of Syrian civil society will face significant obstacles, including a heavy amount of opposition and violence by radical Islamists. This could certainly create an immense amount of conflict even after either Assad or the opposition falls. There may need to be significant change in how social movements in Syria influence society if the above happens and there is more conflict between the more secular and radical elements in Syrian society. A quicker and more blatant revolutionary stance may again be taken by the secular Syrian social movements. Evolutionary social movements in my opinion would be much too slow in a society where violence between two very polarized groups are warring with each other.

Any thoughts on what will happen with civil society if another conflict breaks out in Syria after the civil war ends?

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Structured Response 5


In the chapter, Wickham describes how Nasser was able to suppress all opposition to his regime in Egypt using a variety of techniques. Nasser was able to ban all opposition groups and most importantly created state control over areas that these groups had previously used to connect with the mass public. Diminishing the education of the lower classes also helped control them and not allow them to become acquainted with what the regime would consider new and dangerous ideas. Nasser focused on “helping” the lower classes, but these “entitlements” to them ended up difficult to uphold because of their high costs. As a result, this policy of a “social contract” for state redistribution appeased the lower classes but ultimately failed.
Wickham claims that is was more than just repression that allowed the Nasser regime to rule Egypt so forcefully. Not just repressed, the country’s youth was silenced by the “economic, political, and ideological incorporation by the Nasser regime” (Wickham 35). Short term, this was a successful strategy, but over time economic recession, military defeat, and political crisis all allowed the formerly oppressed citizens to come forward and reject the regime’s failure. In replacement of the Nasser regime came successors who tried to “devise a new formula of legitimacy” (Wickham 35) in which they attempted to create new ties between the state and educated youth. However, the new regimes only made the distance between youth and state large, thus allowing Islamic groups to take control of the region.
Now, after the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Islamic governments have become a sign of stability and comfort to those in the region who had almost grown accustomed to constant protests and violence. Islamic governments, like the Muslim Brotherhood ruling in Egypt, represent something that most Middle Easterners understand and have deep roots with. Many Middle Easterners also view secular and western reforms to be complete failures; they want their protests to bring about a government that is entirely their own – not created and implemented by western secularist who do not fully understand them. Unfortunately, many Islamic political movements are unorganized and without a clear plan for political reform, unlike western groups like NGOs or other organizations that have developed policies that could be implemented to create success in the region. These policies are well thought out and a result of extensive research and understanding, but it is difficult for the people of a Middle Eastern region to trust western influences. Therefore, the people of the Middle East are now turning to what they know best, religious groups like the Islamic political parties, to rule them after the chaos of the Arab Spring revolts. 

Monday, October 15, 2012

Reflection #5- Hanna

SO! I finally met up with Khalid, aka themoornextdoor. We met up on Friday afternoon at a DuPont Starbucks. I'll admit...I was expecting him to be a middle-aged well-established gentleman. Instead, He was something like a 26 year old boy genius...or he looked young at least. After a very awkward introduction, I asked him if he recommended any additional readings for my country group.
He highly recommended the following for those interested in Algeria:
Algeria: Politics of the Socialist Revolution by someone I was not fast enough to write down
The Algerian Civil War by Martinez
Managing Instability in Algeria published by Rutledge and too expensive for me.

I then lead in with a simple, "Could you elaborate on Algerian Civil Society and what can you teach me about Algeria that I can't learn from a Google search?"
So then he started talking, and talking, and talking. He filled any potentially awkward silence with information about Algeria. He spoke for a solid two hours. Quickly yet smoothly, I understood every word...but my note taking did not always keep up. I drifted between complete focus and fantasizing about how he was going to stop talking soon and say something very suave and non-robotic.
Despite being one of the top five most awkward robot people I have ever met, I got a lot of good information. Here it goes:


  • The Algerian mindset is 30 yrs behind- They still believe in big government and they want more regulation
  • Civil Society is mostly groups relating to religion or neighborhoods and they have many youth associations
  • Society is fragmented; no solidarity, everything is local except political groups
  • FLN monopolizes Civil Society groups and assimilates them- most have connection to FLN. Civil Society groups are not seen as independent by the people.
  • Major Youth Associations: UNJA and SNAPAP, both of whom have many groups that have broken off from them with very similar names.
  • These student groups are linked into Arab Unions.
  • the 2011 strikes came from Independent SNAPAP (one of the break off groups)
  • Ministries are very important because they are the closest thing to civil society that actually is able to get things done. Ministry of Agriculture and Peasants is most influential
  • The cities are overpopulated and there has been a housing shortage since the 80s
  • No housing development- there is a lot of illegal housing and the politicians are all in the business of selling cement and PVC pipes. The housing problem is too big of a problem for government to know where to begin.
  • Official count of votes is steadily declining. Government will say that the voting percent is, say, 56% but it is actually much lower and lower than 36%. Khalid says that on voting day the streets are empty.
  • the only people who vote are old people and people who are apart of political parties. 
  • Similar to Moroccan Society and would be more so if French had never been present.
  • The military is the elite and is viewed positively by most members of the public. 
I have three more pages of notes and I don't think that any of you care enough about Algeria to read them if I posted them....
Anyways...After two hours of talking non-stop. He just stopped talking, said it was nice to meet me and basically ran out of Starbucks. Like Ran. Leaving me very confused as to what had just happened over the past two hours. I'm still not really sure what that was. He isss a blogger so I don't know why I expected him to be a non-awkward member of society. Either way, GT's with themoornextdoor.

Reflection 5


I know it’s a little early to post a reflection but I read an article today that I found interesting and wanted to talk about while it was still fresh in my head. The article is on the Washington Post and is similar to many articles I see about the Middle East. This article (here’s the link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/human-rights-watch-says-tunisian-authorities-not-investigating-attacks-by-religious-extremists/2012/10/15/4b1ad204-16d3-11e2-a346-f24efc680b8d_story.html) discussed attacks in Tunisia by religious extremists. The attacks have been occurring for the past 10 months and the government has done nothing to stop the ultra-conservative Islamist Salafis that are responsible. The police have not made any arrests or even prompted an investigation even though six formal complaints have been filed. For that reason, the Human Rights Watch based in New York is urging the Tunisian authorities to take action.
I will keep following this story to see if the Human Rights Watch is taken seriously by the Tunisian government, but I am doubtful that this action and ones like it are actually beneficial in the region. Many groups similar to Human Rights Watch (Amnesty International, etc.) call for change in the region and try to pressure the government, but they are simply not enough. These groups have no real backbone to support their allegations; they cannot force change, only recommend it. It seems that the people of Tunisia are unhappy with the dangerous attacks, so it would make more sense if there were domestic organizations that could address situations like this instead of international organizations. An organization based in Tunisia might gain more support or have more clout that an international organization that is sometimes distrusted by the people of the country being affected. It will be interesting to see how the situation in Tunisia plays out and how the government responds to the Human Rights Watch because as of today they have made no comment.