Thursday, October 18, 2012

Reflection #5

I was reading an interesting article online about the Israeli newspaper industry. Lately, the predominance of the free newspaper, Israel Today, run by American, Sheldon Adelson, is threatening the livelihood of the regions oldest newspapers. Adelson has close ties with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the American Republican party, particularly know for his support of Mitt Romney. Adelson's paper is handed out all over the area, and the new low advertising prices have allowed the paper to dominate 40% the market. This shift is beginning to, and has the potential to, change the political atmosphere of Israel's press. This free newspaper's close ties with the Prime Minister's office are apparent. Israel Today's lead columnist receives not only his salary through the paper, but also an addition salary from the prime minister's office. Even one of Netanyhu's advisers left his job with the minister to aid in the paper's launch. Conveniently, the upcoming election has been pushed up, and Israel Today has Netanyhu far in the lead. If this paper pushes all others out of business, it will be easy for the political office to control the print media in Israel and impossible for citizens to get a unbiased newspaper. 



Reflection #5

During my usual morning stroll to Megabytes to get some coffee and a bagel, I found quite an interesting and in my opinion significant article by David Sanger on the front page of the New York times.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

This particular article outlines how the U.S. claims much of the weaponry that is sent from Qatar to "Syrian rebels" is actually going to the more hardline Islamic groups, not the "more secular opposition groups" within the Syria conflict (Sanger). This, according to the New York times, may be creating future conflict for after either the opposition or the Assad Regime falls (Sanger). There have even been (non conclusive) reports of the radical Syrian Islamist groups buying a capacious amount of weapons from their donor countries and burying them underground for use in future conflict (Sanger).

This may show that there is an increasing radical element within Syrian society which may later serve to further destabilize any rebuilding efforts after the civil war is over. If these radical Islamic organizations obtain more power through Qatar and Saudi Arabia's heavy military aid, civil society may be altered and would undergo vast challenges. Social entrepreneurship initiatives by some of the secular parts of Syrian civil society will face significant obstacles, including a heavy amount of opposition and violence by radical Islamists. This could certainly create an immense amount of conflict even after either Assad or the opposition falls. There may need to be significant change in how social movements in Syria influence society if the above happens and there is more conflict between the more secular and radical elements in Syrian society. A quicker and more blatant revolutionary stance may again be taken by the secular Syrian social movements. Evolutionary social movements in my opinion would be much too slow in a society where violence between two very polarized groups are warring with each other.

Any thoughts on what will happen with civil society if another conflict breaks out in Syria after the civil war ends?

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

Structured Response 5


In the chapter, Wickham describes how Nasser was able to suppress all opposition to his regime in Egypt using a variety of techniques. Nasser was able to ban all opposition groups and most importantly created state control over areas that these groups had previously used to connect with the mass public. Diminishing the education of the lower classes also helped control them and not allow them to become acquainted with what the regime would consider new and dangerous ideas. Nasser focused on “helping” the lower classes, but these “entitlements” to them ended up difficult to uphold because of their high costs. As a result, this policy of a “social contract” for state redistribution appeased the lower classes but ultimately failed.
Wickham claims that is was more than just repression that allowed the Nasser regime to rule Egypt so forcefully. Not just repressed, the country’s youth was silenced by the “economic, political, and ideological incorporation by the Nasser regime” (Wickham 35). Short term, this was a successful strategy, but over time economic recession, military defeat, and political crisis all allowed the formerly oppressed citizens to come forward and reject the regime’s failure. In replacement of the Nasser regime came successors who tried to “devise a new formula of legitimacy” (Wickham 35) in which they attempted to create new ties between the state and educated youth. However, the new regimes only made the distance between youth and state large, thus allowing Islamic groups to take control of the region.
Now, after the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Islamic governments have become a sign of stability and comfort to those in the region who had almost grown accustomed to constant protests and violence. Islamic governments, like the Muslim Brotherhood ruling in Egypt, represent something that most Middle Easterners understand and have deep roots with. Many Middle Easterners also view secular and western reforms to be complete failures; they want their protests to bring about a government that is entirely their own – not created and implemented by western secularist who do not fully understand them. Unfortunately, many Islamic political movements are unorganized and without a clear plan for political reform, unlike western groups like NGOs or other organizations that have developed policies that could be implemented to create success in the region. These policies are well thought out and a result of extensive research and understanding, but it is difficult for the people of a Middle Eastern region to trust western influences. Therefore, the people of the Middle East are now turning to what they know best, religious groups like the Islamic political parties, to rule them after the chaos of the Arab Spring revolts. 

Monday, October 15, 2012

Reflection #5- Hanna

SO! I finally met up with Khalid, aka themoornextdoor. We met up on Friday afternoon at a DuPont Starbucks. I'll admit...I was expecting him to be a middle-aged well-established gentleman. Instead, He was something like a 26 year old boy genius...or he looked young at least. After a very awkward introduction, I asked him if he recommended any additional readings for my country group.
He highly recommended the following for those interested in Algeria:
Algeria: Politics of the Socialist Revolution by someone I was not fast enough to write down
The Algerian Civil War by Martinez
Managing Instability in Algeria published by Rutledge and too expensive for me.

I then lead in with a simple, "Could you elaborate on Algerian Civil Society and what can you teach me about Algeria that I can't learn from a Google search?"
So then he started talking, and talking, and talking. He filled any potentially awkward silence with information about Algeria. He spoke for a solid two hours. Quickly yet smoothly, I understood every word...but my note taking did not always keep up. I drifted between complete focus and fantasizing about how he was going to stop talking soon and say something very suave and non-robotic.
Despite being one of the top five most awkward robot people I have ever met, I got a lot of good information. Here it goes:


  • The Algerian mindset is 30 yrs behind- They still believe in big government and they want more regulation
  • Civil Society is mostly groups relating to religion or neighborhoods and they have many youth associations
  • Society is fragmented; no solidarity, everything is local except political groups
  • FLN monopolizes Civil Society groups and assimilates them- most have connection to FLN. Civil Society groups are not seen as independent by the people.
  • Major Youth Associations: UNJA and SNAPAP, both of whom have many groups that have broken off from them with very similar names.
  • These student groups are linked into Arab Unions.
  • the 2011 strikes came from Independent SNAPAP (one of the break off groups)
  • Ministries are very important because they are the closest thing to civil society that actually is able to get things done. Ministry of Agriculture and Peasants is most influential
  • The cities are overpopulated and there has been a housing shortage since the 80s
  • No housing development- there is a lot of illegal housing and the politicians are all in the business of selling cement and PVC pipes. The housing problem is too big of a problem for government to know where to begin.
  • Official count of votes is steadily declining. Government will say that the voting percent is, say, 56% but it is actually much lower and lower than 36%. Khalid says that on voting day the streets are empty.
  • the only people who vote are old people and people who are apart of political parties. 
  • Similar to Moroccan Society and would be more so if French had never been present.
  • The military is the elite and is viewed positively by most members of the public. 
I have three more pages of notes and I don't think that any of you care enough about Algeria to read them if I posted them....
Anyways...After two hours of talking non-stop. He just stopped talking, said it was nice to meet me and basically ran out of Starbucks. Like Ran. Leaving me very confused as to what had just happened over the past two hours. I'm still not really sure what that was. He isss a blogger so I don't know why I expected him to be a non-awkward member of society. Either way, GT's with themoornextdoor.

Reflection 5


I know it’s a little early to post a reflection but I read an article today that I found interesting and wanted to talk about while it was still fresh in my head. The article is on the Washington Post and is similar to many articles I see about the Middle East. This article (here’s the link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/human-rights-watch-says-tunisian-authorities-not-investigating-attacks-by-religious-extremists/2012/10/15/4b1ad204-16d3-11e2-a346-f24efc680b8d_story.html) discussed attacks in Tunisia by religious extremists. The attacks have been occurring for the past 10 months and the government has done nothing to stop the ultra-conservative Islamist Salafis that are responsible. The police have not made any arrests or even prompted an investigation even though six formal complaints have been filed. For that reason, the Human Rights Watch based in New York is urging the Tunisian authorities to take action.
I will keep following this story to see if the Human Rights Watch is taken seriously by the Tunisian government, but I am doubtful that this action and ones like it are actually beneficial in the region. Many groups similar to Human Rights Watch (Amnesty International, etc.) call for change in the region and try to pressure the government, but they are simply not enough. These groups have no real backbone to support their allegations; they cannot force change, only recommend it. It seems that the people of Tunisia are unhappy with the dangerous attacks, so it would make more sense if there were domestic organizations that could address situations like this instead of international organizations. An organization based in Tunisia might gain more support or have more clout that an international organization that is sometimes distrusted by the people of the country being affected. It will be interesting to see how the situation in Tunisia plays out and how the government responds to the Human Rights Watch because as of today they have made no comment.  

Friday, October 12, 2012

Structured Response #4

Social movements and the various governments of states differ extensively across the MENA region; different versions of government often mean different forms of social movements and therefore distinctive obstacles that each movement has to face. Relating to the reading on Nasser's tactics on destroying opposition and gaining support from the Egyptian populace, a centralized government like Nasser's Egypt may indeed attempt to create a "social contract" where the ruling administration/leader gives a disproportionate amount of benefits and distribution to a majority of the population and in return gain the people's support. Nasser's administration, while doing this, also banned much of the Egyptian opposition, jailed them, and greatly suppressed them. Because Nasser had already created the so called "social contract," it seems that much of the populace turned a blind eye to the fact that free speech had been limited in their country. On top of this form of censorship and oppression, organizations like independent student unions were outlawed while the state picked and chose school faculty, enforcing this with the state police. 

How might a social movement overcome this kind of quasi authoritarian obstacle? Grassroots organization, non-violent "civil" protests, and social entrepreneurship are the best options against an oppressive authoritarian-like government. Violence only gets rid of legitimacy in a social movement; for example, the Palestinian Authority after using violence against the State of Israel in the 2nd Intifada lost much of it's viability in the international stage of being suited to be the government of the Palestinian people. Also, when the Syrian opposition movement and other Syrian social movements after the Arab Spring hastily began to use violence against Assad's murderous regime, some of its credibility wasted away as much of the Syrian military that may have been contemplating desertion was practically forced to attack the opposition back. Furthermore, the Syrian social movements began to splinter and a single unified message against Assad cracked into pieces. The violent protests led to a bloody civil war with many different parties involved.

On the other hand, when using grassroots non-violence tactics, the Egyptian Arab Spring activists maintained a certain credibility and the situation did not end in a war as Syria did. Instead, much of the Egyptian military sided with the social movements which resulted in the subsequent stepping down of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Obviously, the military will not always side with an opposition social movement, however non-violent protest seem to get further in their aspirations; for instance, in the case of the Palestinians, a recent hunger strike by Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails resulted in an "easing of their conditions" (article on this can be found here: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/2012514153120630951.html).

All in all, there is probably no formula to making a social movement succeed when there is an oppressive government. However, there is always a right time and place to initiate a call for change, and that call for change needs to be non violent unless significant action (such as violence) is absolutely necessary. 


Thursday, October 11, 2012

Structured Response #4


Structured Response #4

            States in the Middle East, in general, are large, strong, and powerful. At first glance, it might seem like these states are in no need of reform: they employ large numbers of people, have a multitude of resources, and control their domestic affairs with ease. However, many of these states are controlled in some part by the military, and also by many layers of bureaucracy. Both of these issues make reform quite difficult, especially when the government in place is critical and suspicious of any reform that might weaken its powers and has the military in its control to fight off any types of forced reform – like rebellion. Not only are regimes adverse to reform, it is also very difficult to logistically create any reform because of the red tape of the bureaucratic system.
            Gilbert of Beyond Research and Development seemed especially frustrated by the lack of progress that had been made when it comes to reform in the MENA region since the 1990’s. The initial flood of western funds for civil society and democratization that came around 1995 were not enough to create actually change in the region. Gilbert explained that NGOs and other CSOs have the best policy makers who know more about policy in their respective countries than the government’s actually policy makers, but the policies they have created cannot be put in place because the current regimes want nothing to do with reform. NGOs and CSOs are sucked into political parties and sit on boards that function for no positive change – it’s all talk. If any true reform and democratization is going to happen in the MENA region that has to change.
            Gilbert outlined the new strategy that Beyond Research and Development and other groups are going to start using, which is returning to more grassroots reforms and social movements to promote democracy and change. Change can only happen in the MENA region if the people working for it actually care. Volunteers may be a more beneficial group than salaried workers coming for their 8 hour shift just to make a living – not because they are passionate about democratization in the Middle East. Hopefully grassroots organizations will produce actual change and gain momentum so that the beneficial policies that have been created can actually be put into place.